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Abstract 
There have been important recent developments in law, research, policy and practice relating 
to supporting people with decision-making impairments, in particular when a person’s wishes 
and preferences are unclear or inaccessible. A driver in this respect is the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the implications of the CRPD 
for policy and professional practices are currently debated. This article reviews and compares 
four legal frameworks for supported and substitute decision-making for people whose decision-
making ability is impaired. In particular, it explores how these frameworks may apply to people 
with mental health problems. The four jurisdictions are: Ontario, Canada; Victoria, Australia; 
England and Wales, United Kingdom (UK); and Northern Ireland, UK. Comparisons and 
contrasts are made in the key areas of: the legal framework for supported and substitute 
decision-making; the criteria for intervention; the assessment process; the safeguards; and 
issues in practice. Thus Ontario has developed a relatively comprehensive, progressive and 
influential legal framework over the past thirty years but there remain concerns about the 
standardisation of decision-making ability assessments and how the laws work together. In 
Australia, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (2012) has recommended that the six 
different types of substitute decision-making under the three laws in that jurisdiction, need to 
be simplified, and integrated into a spectrum that includes supported decision-making. In 
England and Wales the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has a complex interface with mental health 
law. In Northern Ireland it is proposed to introduce a new Mental Capacity (Health, Welfare 
and Finance) Bill that will provide a unified structure for all substitute decision-making. The 
discussion will consider the key strengths and limitations of the approaches in each jurisdiction 
and identify possible ways that further progress can be made in law, policy and practice. 
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1. Introduction 
This article seeks to reflect on issues of law, research, policy and practice in the context of what 
is described in international disability law as supported and substitute decision-making. To do 
so it will compare developments across four chosen jurisdictions: Ontario, Canada; Victoria, 
Australia; England and Wales; and Northern Ireland. We are particularly interested in  
decision-making that  may be impaired due to mental health problems, because, in many 
jurisdictions, substitute decision making laws based on decision making ability - in particular, 
guardianship and other mental capacity laws - have been developed in parallel to existing and 
separate mental health laws. In a number of situations this has created complex overlaps and 
some logical inconsistencies that discriminate against people with mental health problems. To 
deal with this Dawson and Szmukler (2006) and Szmukler, Daw and Callard (2014) have 
proposed that there should be a single or fused framework to facilitate interventions, based on 
a mental capacity approach, with appropriate safeguards for everyone. 
 
Previous international comparisons of legal frameworks for decision-making have highlighted 
important commonalities and differences. Campbell, Brophy, Healy and O’Brien (2006) 
focused on the use of compulsory powers in the community and made the important point that 
for any legal framework to be successfully and ethically implemented, adequate services and 
support must be available. Fistein, Holland, Clare and Gunn (2009) compared 32 
Commonwealth mental health laws and identified that only two of them, Scotland and South 
Africa, have included an ability-based capacity test for both hospitalisation and treatment. 
Gray, McSherry, O’ Reilly and Weller (2010) examined mental health laws across Australian 
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and Canadian jurisdictions and concluded that mental health law in Australia has tended to 
have to have a stronger focus on treatment rather than a rights-based focus to be found in some 
Canadian laws. In the light of such comparisons, and a number of recent developments in policy 
and law, we later re-examine and compare some of these issues in the context of our chosen 
four jurisdictions. 
 
Before doing so it is important to acknowledge some of the on-going debates that have been 
raised about supported and substitute decision-making, particularly with reference to the CRPD 
(Power, Lord & DeFranco, 2013). The CRPD, and its associated jurisprudence (Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014) have provoked discussion on a range of key 
questions about legal frameworks for supported and substitute decision-making: 
 
(i) Should mental health problems be framed and regarded as a form of disability? Article 
1 of the CRPD states that “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. This would 
suggest that long-term impairments due to mental health problems should be regarded as a 
form of disability. Kelly (2014) points out that this definition is not presented as being 
comprehensive, it includes people with long-term impairments but does not exclude others. It 
is hard to justify why short-term and/or fluctuating disabling mental health problems would not 
also raise the same issues and require the same protections.  Substitute decision-making under 
mental health law, usually in the form of compulsory intervention, has traditionally been based 
on the criteria of mental disorder and risk. 
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(ii) Is any form of substitute decision making necessary? And can any form of substitute 
decision making be compatible with the CRPD? 
Article 12 of the CRPD requires States to: “recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others” (12.2); that States “take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal 
capacity” (12.3); and States should “ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal 
capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards” (12.4). There has been considerable 
argument about what ‘exercising legal capacity on an equal basis with others’ actually means. 
McSherry (2012) has asserted that legal capacity, as it is advanced in international human rights 
law, includes both a person’s legal standing or status, and their legal agency or power to act. 
This notion of legal capacity is distinct from mental capacity, which refers to a designation of 
cognitive functioning. This suggests that even if a citizen is  not able to make a specific 
decision, in other words they  do not have the mental capacity to decide and cannot exercise 
their  power to act, their  legal rights should not be compromised, hence the need for 
‘appropriate and effective safeguards’. The terms 'supported decision-making' and 'substitute 
decision-making' are also contested, interpreted variously by commentators and governments.   
At issue is how states can adhere to the mandate of Article 12 to ensure that people with 
disabilities can be provided with 'support to exercise legal capacity' on an equal basis with 
others; this we argue below is a particularly challenging proposition in the context of mental 
health law and service provision. It would be concerning if this notion was to be interpreted as 
requiring the extreme libertarian or Szaszian (1961) position where compulsory intervention, 
based on impairment due to mental health problems, should not be allowed in any 
circumstances.  
 
(iii) How can people with mental health problems be supported to make decisions? 
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Although making every effort to support people to make their own decisions is already 
considered good practice, Article 12 of the CRPD now requires states to: “take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity” (12.3). This question raises a number of issues for practice, in 
particular the need for clarification between formal supports to ensure legal capacity and more 
general supports for decision making (Browning, Bigby & Douglas, 2014). Then (2013) 
highlights remaining conceptual, legal and practical problems in defining and implementing 
supported decision-making. Reviews of the research evidence on what works in supporting 
people to make decisions suggest that, although there are some approaches that do appear to 
be effective for some people, further research is needed to develop effective, comprehensive 
supported decision making systems (Carney, 2014; Davidson et al, in press; Kohn, Blumenthal 
& Campbell, 2012). 
 
In addition to the impact of the CRPD on debates about reforming mental health law and policy, 
two other significant issues in the literature are relevant to this article - risk assessment and 
effectiveness. Large, Ryan, Singh, Paton and Nielssen (2011) have argued that risk assessment 
cannot sufficiently and accurately predict who is, or is not, going to harm themselves or others; 
the result is that a very high number of false positives are assumed (in other words people who 
are assessed as presenting a high risk who will not cause harm). Szmukler and Rose (2013) 
have further explored some of the unintended consequences of basing substitute decision-
making on such an inaccurate process and highlighted its negative impact on trust in therapeutic 
relationships and in the consequent implications for social exclusion and discrimination.  
 
The final development, which will only be considered briefly here, is the outcome of research 
into risk-based legal frameworks for involuntary treatment in community settings (often 
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referred to as Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) or ‘assisted outpatient treatment’). The 
most recent randomised controlled trial of CTOs (Burns et al., 2013), which compared brief to 
prolonged compulsion, mirrored findings from previous studies (Churchill, Owen, Singh & 
Hotopf, 2007). The evidence indicates that assessment approaches focusing on the duality of 
mental disorder and risk, and subsequent restrictions on autonomy, do not appear to be an 
effective approach to reducing readmission rates in these contexts (Rugkåsa & Dawson, 2013).    
 
Given the developments in research and in international human rights law noted above we 
believe that it is timely to consider current legal frameworks for supported and substituted 
decision-making in the context of mental health law, policy and context, in particular which 
aspects may need to be reformed or replaced.  
 
2. Supported and substitute decision-making 
Before examining each chosen jurisdiction it is useful to consider the meaning of the terms 
‘supported decision-making’ and ‘substitute decision-making.’ The term ‘supported decision-
making’ is not defined in the CRPD, but some understanding can be found in Article 12(3), 
particularly the obligation it places on States to provide ‘access by persons with disabilities to 
the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity’ on an equal basis with others. 
Hence, in international human rights law, ‘supported decision-making’ is one constitutive 
element of ‘support to exercise legal capacity,’ and refers to a person making a decision on his 
or her own behalf, with support in order to exercise his or her legal capacity (Browning, Bigby 
& Douglas, 2014). Further elaboration is provided by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in its United Nations Handbook for Parliamentarians (2007), which states that:  
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 Supported decision-making can take many forms. Those assisting a person may 
 communicate the individual’s intentions to others or help him/her understand the 
 choices at hand. They may help others to realize that a person with significant 
 disabilities is also a person with a history, interests and aims in life, and is someone 
 capable of exercising his/her legal capacity. (pp. 90-91). 
 
Various definitions tend to focus on the straightforward proposition of assisting people who 
require support to make their own decisions. For example, the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission (2012, p.xviii), defines supported decision-making as: “An approach to decision 
making that involves providing a person with impaired decision making ability the support they 
need to make their own decision. It is often contrasted with substitute decision making, where 
a decision is made on behalf of a person who is unable to make that decision.”  
 
The term ‘substitute decision-making’ is used in international disability rights law to refer to 
the appointment of someone to make decisions on behalf of a person deemed to lack the mental 
capacity required for a decision to be made (for example, regarding accommodation, 
healthcare, or financial decisions). The CRPD Committee (2014) define ‘substituted decision-
making regimes’ as follows: 
Substitute decision-making regimes can take many different forms, 
including plenary guardianship, judicial interdiction and partial 
guardianship. However, these regimes have certain common 
characteristics: they can be defined as systems where (i) legal capacity is 
removed from a person, even if this is just in respect of a single decision; 
(ii) a substitute decision-maker can be appointed by someone other than 
the person concerned, and this can be done against his or her will or (iii) 
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any decision made by a substitute decision-maker is based on what is 
believed to be in the objective “best interests” of the person concerned, 
as opposed to being based on the person’s own will and preferences. 
(Paragraph 23)  
As the CRPD Committee point out, the range of ‘substituted decision-making in law’ is 
difficult to generalise; it includes arrangements such as powers of attorney, court-appointed 
deputies, guardianship, wards of court and compulsory intervention under mental health law – 
all of which differ considerably in their nature, and in the extent to which they intercede on a 
person’s legal capacity.   
 
The distinction between supported and substituted decision-making is not always clear. For 
example, in some jurisdictions (such as Alberta, Saskatchewan and law proposed in the 
Republic of Ireland) there are co-decision-making arrangements which involve the courts 
appointing someone to assist the person to make decisions, but under these arrangements the 
person’s autonomy is not viewed to be absolute and so these processes may be regarded as a 
more limited forms of substitute decision-making – at least, according to the definition of the 
CRPD Committee. Further, the CRPD Committee has interpreted Article 12 so that in ‘hard 
cases’, such as where a person is minimally communicative or is in a comatose state, decision-
making by third parties might be guided by the ‘best interpretation of the person’s will and 
preferences’ – not a ‘best interests’ standard. It could be argued that it is a semantic stretch to 
frame responses to these most difficult situations as supported decision making based only on 
the person’s own will and preferences, this implies that there is a need for a  new way of framing 
these situations.  Again, these terms seem to be used variously in different contexts, and the 
translation of these concepts into law and policy at the domestic level is very much a work in 
progress. 
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No jurisdiction appears likely in the near future to eliminate substituted decision-making 
according to the standard set by the CRPD Committee. As shall be discussed below, domestic 
laws which encourage or require supported decision-making can be viewed in terms of 
spectrum across in which substitute decision-making is also involved. This ranges from: 
autonomous decision-making at one end, supported decision-making as a mid-way point, and 
substituted decision-making in exceptional cases, at the other end of the spectrum. This 
pragmatic response does not meet the CRPD Committee’s directive that States replace 
substitute decision-making regimes by supported decision-making. The CRPD Committee 
(2014) have stated, “the development of supported decision-making systems in parallel with 
the maintenance of substitute decision-making regimes is not sufficient to comply with article 
12 of the Convention.” (p.6). 
 
In considering how a law and policy framework might support people to exercise their legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others, it is important to note the wide scope of reform of law 
that would be necessary to remove use of mental capacity assessments and ‘best interests’ 
standards that guide ‘coercive care’, to use McSherry and Freckleton’s (2013)  term.  In order 
to reform laws to meet the mandate of Article 12 of the CRPD a range of other multiple areas 
of law, including criminal law, contract law, and health law would have to take place. Hence, 
it is perhaps salient to consider Carney’s (2012) warning that a ‘uniformity of approach may 
appeal to purists or academic commentators, (but) overlooks the need to accommodate local 
values, institutions and patterns of administration.’ (pp. 9-10). This is the position we now take 
in comparing and contrasting international laws in this area. 
 
3. Results 
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We now describe and analyse the supported and substitute decision-making in the four chosen 
jurisdictions in the context of five areas: The legal framework for supported and substitute 
decision- making; The criteria for intervention; The assessment process; Safeguards; Issues in 
practice 
 
3.1 Ontario, Canada 
The legal framework for supported and substitute decision-making 
Canada signed the CRPD in 2007 and ratified it in 2010 with a reservation that its 
understanding of Article 12 was that it did allow substitute as well as supported decision-
making. The legal framework for substitute decision-making in Ontario is provided through 
four provincial statutes which cover different aspects of decision-making for people who are 
assessed to be incapable of making the relevant decision: the Substitute Decisions Act 1992; 
Health Care Consent Act, 1996; Mental Health Act (most recently amended in 2000); and the 
Personal Health Information Protection Act 2004. D’Arcy Hiltz and Anita Szigeti in ‘A Guide 
to Consent and Capacity Law in Ontario’(2014),  identify four types of decisions addressed by 
the legislation: decisions regarding ‘property’, ‘treatment/placement’,  ’detention’, and 
’personal health information’. Hiltz and Szigeti (2014) state: “We are all presumed to have the 
capacity to manage our own property, to make our own decisions regarding treatment and 
disclosure of personal health information, and to live freely where we choose. Once we become 
sufficiently incapacitated that we or others are at serious risk of harm, the state owes us a duty 
to protect our interests and that of the community” (p.1).  
In Ontario, the law and policy which requires support to be provided to enable the person to 
make the relevant decision tends to be underpinned through legal requirements around consent 
or broad policy positions on the importance of person-centred interventions, for example 
through the recovery approach. An example of the legal requirements on consent is described 
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under the Health Care Consent Act (s.11(2)) where, for consent to be informed, the person 
should have received the information that “a reasonable person in the same circumstances 
would require in order to make a decision about the treatment”. Ontario's Mental Health and 
Addictions Strategy (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2011) outlines the broad policy 
approach and specifies that all services should be based on the principles of: respect and 
understanding; healthy development, hope and recovery; person-directed services; and 
diversity, equity and social justice.        
 
The criteria for intervention 
Each of the four areas of decision making has unique criteria for intervention, assessment 
process, and safeguards. The test for capacity remains the same.  For example, with respect to 
the management of property, findings of incapacity may be made under the MHA or the 
Substitute Decisions Act. The MHA only applies to patients in a mental health facility.  Under 
the MHA it is the responsibility of the attending physician to assess capacity to manage 
property. In all other circumstances capacity to manage property is assessed by a capacity 
assessor who may be a social worker or member of another regulated profession who has 
received additional training and certification.  The test for capacity to manage property is 
found in the SDA 1992: “A person is incapable of managing property if the person is not able 
to understand information that is relevant to making a decision in the management of his or 
her property, or is not able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a 
decision or lack of decision” s.6, SDA. The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee is the 
decision maker ‘of last resort’. In the absence of a pre-existing power of attorney, the office 
of the Public Guardian and Trustee becomes the statutory guardian of the incapable person’s 
property.  
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The assessment process 
For treatment decisions, it is the responsibility of the regulated health professional proposing 
the intervention to determine whether the person has the capacity to decide about the 
intervention but there is no specific assessment tool or recording format for this process. In 
Ontario there are more than twenty regulated health professions accountable to the public 
through their regulatory colleges. Social workers are not included as a regulated health 
profession, but psychologists are. Within institutional care, mental health law specifies that it 
is the responsibility of the physician providing treatment to assess the capacity of their patient. 
However, each regulated profession (including social work) is required by their College to 
assess capacity for informed consent if it rests with the patient. Otherwise, all treatment 
providers are required to use the identified substitute decision maker. Physicians may assume 
capacity unless they have reason to believe otherwise. A person admitted to a health care 
facility found to be without capacity to make treatment decisions is notified in writing via a 
Mental Health Act Form 33. The law also requires that a rights advisor is notified of this finding 
and that the person receive appropriate advice. The person may refuse rights advice. 
 
Under the Substitute Decisions Act decisions about property, finances and personal care, 
specific guidance issued by the Capacity Assessment Office (2005) which states that it is the 
responsibility of the assessor to “to record, verify, organize and summarize the relevant 
information gathered from the person being assessed, as well as from family, professional care-
givers or multi-disciplinary consultants and review of objective records. The assessor then 
evaluates this wealth of multi-dimensional information within the appropriate legal framework 
to arrive at an opinion about mental capacity” (p. III.1). Capacity assessors are members of 
regulatory colleges (including social workers) who have completed an assessed two day 
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training course, then maintain their practice (conducting at least five assessments every two 
years).  
 
Safeguards 
Under the Substitute Decisions Act a person being assessed in the community must consent to 
the assessment, and also pay for the assessment. A court may order an assessment if there is 
sufficient concern about the person's capacity. People admitted to health care facilities are not 
required to consent to an assessment of their capacity, but they are required to receive rights 
advice following a finding of incapacity. Right advice is usually provided by the PPAO 
(Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office). The PPAO offers instructed and non-instructed 
advocacy services. It is also possible for the person to appeal against the assessment to an 
independent tribunal, the Consent and Capacity Board. It should also be noted that the law 
provides directions to substitute decision makers- decisions are to be made based first on any 
known prior capable wishes, and second, in the best interests of the incapable person.  
 
Issues in practice 
Consent and capacity is a very complex area of law in Ontario. The legal framework that 
ensures individuals receive the treatment they require is, generally, based on an institutional 
model of care. As a result there can be additional challenges for services attempting to engage 
and work with people who lack capacity to make treatment decisions and reside in the 
community. For example, the criteria for CTOs include that, in the previous three years, the 
person has either had two or more admissions to hospital or accumulated 30 or more days of 
in-patient care. This may not sufficiently reflect a more community orientated model of care 
and, in practice, most CTOs are initiated from inpatient units (O'Brien & Farrell, 2005). Implied 
consent is permissible under the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) in order 
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to permit health information to be transferred between health care providers. Is it ethical to rely 
on implied consent if the person is receiving treatment involuntarily? With a wide range of 
possible assessors and processes under different laws and oversight processes it is also difficult 
to determine how consistently assessments are conducted across areas of practice and 
decisions. 
 
3.2 Victoria, Australia 
The legal framework for supported and substitute decision-making 
Australia signed the CRPD in 2007 and ratified it in 2008. As with Canada, the Government 
entered a declaration which interpreted the Convention to allow for substituted decision-
making and ‘compulsory treatment of persons… with mental disability’. Hence, the Victorian 
Government has proposed the introduction of supported decision-making on a spectrum with 
substituted decision-making in guardianship and mental health legislation, both of which have 
been subjected to major review activity in the last five years. Indeed, as of the 1 July 2014, the 
Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) has entered into force. While this overview will principally focus 
on mental health legislation in Victoria, guardianship law reform also warrants brief attention 
as many people with mental illness are subject to financial administration orders and/or 
guardianship orders under this legislation. Australian courts have not engaged with the CRPD 
Committee’s calls for the ‘replacement of substituted decision-making regimes with supported 
decision-making’, including the repeal of mental health legislation, an issue which remains the 
subject of ongoing debate in Australia and elsewhere. 
 
Victoria has had separate substituted decision-making laws relating to adult guardianship (the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986) and involuntary treatment and detention (Mental 
Health Act 1986) for almost three decades. These two Acts formed part of legislation 
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introduced in Victoria in the mid-1980s. This legislation, which was viewed as progressive at 
the time, has been reviewed through a new wave of reform. Recent moves to apply supported 
decision-making in the mental health context in Victoria reflect global efforts to minimise 
restrictive intervention, and to reduce the use of compulsory, non-consensual treatment. A 
number of key drivers have precipitated this trend, particularly: the advent of the CRPD and 
the impact of Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, the shift to 
an emphasis on a recovery approach in mental health policy and practice (Department of 
Health, 2011) and concerns about high rates of coercive psychiatric intervention in Victoria 
(Light, Kerridge, Ryan & Robertson, 2012a and b).  
 
The most recent mental health law reform proposals suggest that the Mental Health Act 2014, 
will promote supported decision-making and recovery principles through features including: 
the presumption of decision-making capacity; improved access to advocacy; advance 
statements; nominated persons; and formal recognition of the role of carers. There is on-going 
debate as to whether a rebuttable presumption of capacity is compliant with Article 12 of the 
CRPD (Morrisey, 2012), and the CRPD Committee – who, again, call for the abandonment of 
assessments of mental capacity altogether – clearly interpret that it is not.  
The Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) (Vic Guardianship Act) provides a 
substituted decision-making arrangement, with safeguards, for people with impaired decision-
making due to disability. Three disability groups are typically subject to the Vic Guardianship 
Act: people with intellectual disabilities, people with cognitive disability (such as dementia and 
acquired brain injury), and those with psychosocial/ mental health disability. Two other statutes 
also provide for substitute decision-making mechanisms and guardianship provisions in 
Victoria: the Instruments Act 1958 (Vic) and the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic). The only 
option for supporting people with impaired decision-making under these laws is to appoint a 
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substitute decision-maker. Six broad appointments for limited substituted decision-making are 
available: guardians, administrators, the ‘person responsible’, attorneys, agents and enduring 
guardians. Victorian guardianship law does not currently provide any formal avenue for 
supported decision-making. However, a comprehensive report by the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission (VLRC) (2012), which drew broadly on Canadian adult guardianship law (Carney 
& Beaupert, 2013), includes two major recommendations to introduce statutory supported 
decision-making mechanisms into current guardianship law: ‘supporters’ and ‘co-decision-
making’.  
 
The VLRC proposed greater ‘overlap’ between mental health and guardianship laws. Their 
major recommendation was to authorise for enduring personal guardians to make psychiatric 
treatment decisions over and above psychiatrists under the Mental Health Act 1986, if a person 
was deemed an involuntary patient due to considerations for their own wellbeing but not for 
reasons of public safety. The VLRC emphasised that guardianship powers should only be used 
for the benefit of the represented person and not for the protection of the public. Such powers 
would mean people with psychosocial disability could potentially appoint (or have appointed) 
a proxy, instead of having the ‘clinical guardianship’ granted to a psychiatrist by default. This 
measure is similar in nature to ‘advance statements’ (where healthcare or other decisions are 
set out in advance, to guide decisions at a future stage at which decision-making ability is 
compromised) and ‘nominated persons’ (where a preferred informal supporter is given a formal 
status to assist with healthcare and other decision-making). 
 
Where substitute decision-making measures are taken, the VLRC proposed the replacement of 
the ‘best interests’ approach with a ‘substituted judgment approach’ (though there were some 
exceptions to this, such as where financial decisions were concerned). The ‘best interests’ 
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standard was criticised for being too vague and often used as a euphemism for overriding the 
will of the individual. ‘Substituted judgment’ refers to representatives making a judgment 
based on the perceived wishes of the person with the impairment. 
 
The criteria for intervention 
Under the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) the Tribunal must make a Treatment Order if it is 
satisfied that the treatment criteria in s. 5 apply to the person, namely: 
(a) the person has mental illness; and 
(b) because the person has mental illness, the person needs immediate treatment 
to prevent – 
 (i) serious deterioration in the person’s mental or physical health; or 
 (ii) serious harm to the person or to another person; and 
(c) the immediate treatment will be provided to the person if the person is subject to a 
Temporary Treatment Order or a Treatment Order; and 
(d) there is no less restrictive means reasonably available to enable the person to receive the 
immediate treatment. 
 
Section 22 of the Vic Guardianship Act sets out the criteria by which the specialised tribunal 
decides upon guardianship appointments: 
 
(1) If the Tribunal is satisfied that the person in respect of whom an application for an order 
appointing a guardian is made— 
 (a) is a person with a disability; and 
 (b) is unable by reason of the disability to make reasonable judgments in respect of all 
 or any of the matters relating to her or his person or circumstances; and 
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 (c) is in need of a guardian—the Tribunal may make an order appointing a plenary 
 guardian or a limited guardian in respect of that person. 
 
The assessment process 
The Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) enables mental health practitioners and psychiatrists to 
initially order treatment in the context of assessment and temporary treatment orders if they are 
satisfied that the criteria for compulsory intervention, as set out above, are met. 
 
The Vic Guardianship Act uses a functional approach to assessing capacity (even as the lack 
of ‘reasonable judgment’ must arise due to disability), and was one of the first adult capacity 
statutes in the world to discard explicitly status-based, disability-specific assessment. 
Nonetheless, the Act continues to draw a sharp distinction between those who have capacity 
and those who do not. This may change in the light of recent reform activity, which would 
bring assessment processes for statutory supported decision-making closer to that of Ontario 
described above.  
 
Safeguards 
The new Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) seeks to embed a supported decision making model in 
order to enable compulsory patients to be involved in decision-making to the greatest extent 
possible and have their views and preferences respected. The key mechanisms that have been 
introduced to support  recovery and enable supported-decision making include the  
presumption of capacity; a nominated persons scheme; the ability of patients to prepare  
advance statements that provide information about their treatment preferences and the 
introduction of a strengthened second psychiatric opinions scheme and improved access to 
advocacy. 
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As noted previously, the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) has made some important changes 
that mean that mental health practitioners and psychiatrists can initially order treatment in the 
context of assessment and temporary treatment orders, but the new Mental Health Tribunal 
(formerly the Mental Health Review Board) now has primary decision powers in relation to 
extended orders. The Tribunal, in the context of a staged order scheme, has become the 
primary decision-maker for orders extending beyond 28 days. This represents an improved 
safeguard for those subject to orders because the Tribunal is now  required to interpret a more 
specific and ‘tightened’ involuntary admission criteria, to base their decision on evidence 
presented by treating teams and the Tribunal has discretion regarding the length and location 
of the order (inpatient or community). Also the Act requires that decision making by 
psychiatrists and the Tribunal must take into account the person’s views and preferences 
about treatment of his or her mental illness and the reasons for those views and preferences, 
including any recovery outcomes that he person would like to achieve. This includes taking 
into account people’s advance statement, if they have prepared one, and the views of their 
nominated person, if they have one. The Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) also supports the 
involvement of carers and guardians (section.5.2). 
 
The Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) provides guidance in relation to how to assess capacity to 
give informed consent and stresses the importance of people being treated as least 
restrictively as possible. In assessing capacity to give informed consent under the Mental 
Health Act 2014 (Vic) (Sec 68 (1)), it is emphasised that just because a person is an 
involuntary or compulsory patient that does not mean that they lack capacity to give informed 
consent and that any assessment needs to be specific to the decision at hand (sec 68 (2)) 
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The Vic Guardianship Act was developed to encourage the appointment of family members 
rather than state officials as substitute decision-makers, with a strong emphasis on limited and 
reviewable orders (Carney & Tait, 1997). While relatives or friends are often appointed to assist 
a person to make 'lifestyle' decisions, administrators (or financial managers) can be appointed 
to assist with financial decisions. As a last resort, public officials may be appointed as a 
guardian or administrator. In practice, it is often the person themselves (and not the tribunal) 
who appoints the substitute decision-maker, doing so at a time when they have capacity when 
predicting a future date in which they may be incapable of making certain decisions. 
Guardianship laws contain relatively few mechanisms for reviewing individual decisions by 
guardians. Instead, review measures centre on applying to the tribunal for a rehearing of the 
original guardianship order (Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 60A). 
 
A further safeguard is the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. 
The charter has been used to ensure that a stronger regard to is made to the human rights 
implications of guardianship and administration orders (Chesterman, 2013). 
 
Issues in practice 
Moving to a supported decision-making (SDM) approach presents particular challenges in 
Victoria. There are currently high levels of involuntary treatment – best represented by an 
estimate of 98 per 100,000 people subjected to CTOs (much higher than any other Australian 
state) (Light, Kerridge, Ryan & Robertson, 2012a). This phenomenon is partly explained by 
the service system (minimal use of inpatient beds) and a range of practice issues. On the one 
hand CTOs are strongly supported by service providers who tend to be convinced about their 
effectiveness but they are also viewed to be driven by a service delivery culture that has adapted 
to using and relying upon forms of involuntary treatment. The move to a recovery-oriented 
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service system has tended to be ‘silent’ about how this will relate to people on involuntary 
orders (Light, Kerridge, Ryan & Robertson, 2012b). A highly respected service user advocate, 
Mary O’Hagan (2011), has suggested that legal coercion is “the elephant in the recovery room”. 
O’Hagan suggests that the four cornerstones of a recovery approach are hope and belief in 
people’s potential, self-determination over their lives, the choice of a broad range of services, 
and equal participation in their communities. She argues that legal coercion erodes all the 
cornerstones of the recovery philosophy, yet it remains a core response in mental health 
systems. So, Victorian mental health service providers have a challenge ahead. The move to a 
Tribunal with extended powers and greater restriction on the ease to which involuntary orders 
can be made and justified will require new skills of assessment and innovation in service 
delivery. It will also be important to monitor and support the uptake of mechanisms introduced 
to encourage SDM and a recovery oriented approach, in particular Advance Statements and 
having access to a Nominated Person. In other jurisdictions this has been found to not be 
straightforward and may depend on ensuring that those who use these mechanisms have 
confidence that they will be influential and respected (Shields, Pathare, van der Ham & 
Bunders, 2013). The Act enables ‘overriding’ of Advance Statements by the authorised 
psychiatrist and Nominated Persons have no specific powers under the Act so much of the 
value of these mechanisms will be determined by how they are embedded into practice. It has 
been suggested that, alongside law reform, reducing coercion may be supported through a 
variety of evidence-based strategies. Engagement and adherence has been found to be enhanced 
through enabling increased opportunities for choice (Davidson, Roe, Stern, Zisman-Ilani, 
O'Connell & Corrigan, 2012), an approach that may be supported by the recently announced 
National Disability Insurance Scheme, which provides a self-directed funding approach for 
people with disabilities, including people with mental with disability in Australia, including 
psychosocial disability. Peer support has also been found to improve engagement with services 
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(Jewell, Davidson & Rowe, 2006; Davidson et al., 2012) but this requires significant 
organisational support. Finally, the Victorian Office of the Public Advocate has initiated a pilot 
supported decision-making program that will begin in 2014, which is specifically targeted at 
providing support to highly isolated individuals (Victorian Law Foundation, 2013).  
Developing models to operationalise supported decision-making is an important challenge for 
practice in Victoria at a time of law reform. 
 
3.3 England and Wales 
The legal framework for supported and substitute decision-making 
In England the legal framework for supported and substitute decision-making is determined by 
two pieces of legislation: the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and Mental Health Act 
1983/2007 (MHA). The MCA is underpinned by five principles that can be summarised as 
follows: (i) That capacity should always be presumed; (ii) the optimisation of the person’s 
ability to make decisions; (iii) that patients are entitled to make ‘unwise decisions’; (iv) 
decisions and actions made for people must be in their best interests; (v) and that such decisions 
must be least restrictive in terms of rights and freedoms. The exact wording of the second 
principle is that “A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success” (Section 1(3)). Although this 
commitment to supporting decision-making is appears to be positive, in practice substitute 
decision continues to be the main type of intervention when the MCA is used (Brown, Barber 
& Martin, 2009).  
 
The introduction of the MCA was particularly influenced by the requirement to ‘close the 
Bournewood gap’ (Allen, 2010) which highlighted the longstanding problem of de facto 
detention. This arises when people do not  have the capacity to consent to care, and would be 
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prevented from leaving the care setting, are not held under any formal legal powers and the 
associated safeguards. Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) introduced by the MCA are 
designed to deal with this gap in the legal framework. The MCA also introduced the concept 
of the Lasting Powers of Attorney which enables the Attorney to make decisions about either 
personal welfare and/or property affairs.  Processes associated with property and  lasting power 
of attorney agreements can start before a person has lost capacity, but personal welfare ones 
cannot. A similar process is available to the Court of Protection through the appointment of a 
Deputy. The Deputy is likely to be a family member or perhaps a director of social services. 
The Deputy can consent on the person’s behalf but can never consent to decisions that will 
shorten the person’s life. Sections 24-26 of the MCA defines the concept of Advance Decisions 
and describes that processes which enable persons to refuse future specified treatment, but not 
other acts. Provided advance decisions are made when the person had capacity, and they are 
sufficiently specific to cover the patient’s current predicament, clinicians must respect them. 
They can be made verbally and can be reversed by the individual if they regain capacity. 
Advance decisions that refuse life sustaining treatments (such as ventilation) have to be written, 
signed, and witnessed to be valid. It is incumbent on clinicians to find out if an advance decision 
exists and assess whether it is valid. The interface between the MCA and MHA has created 
complexity to substitute decision-making processes which will be discussed below.  
 
The criteria for intervention 
MCA 2005 s. 3(1) states that “a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable: 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, (b) to retain that information, (c) to 
use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or (d) to 
communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). Under 
the Mental Health Act 1983, the criteria for compulsory admission are the tradition 
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combination of mental disorder and risk, so, for example Section 2 states that “an application 
for admission for assessment may be made in respect of a patient on the grounds that:(a) he is 
suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants the detention of the patient 
in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment followed by medical treatment) for at least a 
limited period; and(b) he ought to be so detained in the interests of his own health or safety or 
with a view to the protection of other persons”. The 2007 amending Act introduced compulsory 
community powers, in Section 17A(5) which may be used if: treatment is appropriate, 
necessary for health, safety or the protection of others, it can be provided in the community 
and is available. So, in the mental health law, the capacity to decide about treatment in hospital 
or community settings is not included in the criteria for compulsion.  
 
The assessment process 
Under the MCA, assessing whether a person has capacity involves two stages. To lack capacity, 
the person must have an impairment of or disturbance in the functioning of the brain or mind 
which leads to an inability to understand, retain, use, or weigh information relevant to a 
decision or to communicate a choice. Although there is a both a diagnostic threshold and a 
component that is specific to a decision, capacity can be assessed only in relation to a specific 
decision; this is a functional rather than status approach to assessing capacity. Mindful of the 
sometimes fluctuating nature of capacity, the MCA requires that capacity should be considered 
for each specific decision. The process for DOLS is that where the Managing Authority 
believes that a person in a care home or hospital will be deprived of their liberty, they contact 
the Supervisory Body to establish if a deprivation of liberty is occurring. Up to six assessment 
tasks are then available, carried out by a range of professionals. Under the MHA compulsory 
intervention is based on an application by the person’s nearest relative or an Approved Mental 
Health Professional and two medical recommendations. 
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Safeguards 
Section 2 of the MCA highlights the steps that must be taken to ensure the Best Interests of the 
person, including a consideration of whether they will have at some other time, capacity, an 
encouragement of the person to fully participate in the decision-making process, consideration 
of past and present interests, consider their beliefs and attitudes and to consult relevant 
professionals, carers and relatives. 
 
Late in the parliamentary process a decision was made to create an Independent Mental 
Capacity Advocate Service. It consists of people employed by independent, voluntary sector 
organisations who provide support and representation to citizens who are subject to the MCA. 
Although their decisions are not binding, professionals are required to consider these when 
making decisions. The MCA Code of Practice describes how advocates can be instructed for 
care reviews or adult protection cases, but they must be instructed and then consulted when 
serious medical treatment is being proposed (such as ventilation, major surgery, chemotherapy, 
and discontinuation of artificial nutrition or hydration). They must also be involved when 
accommodation for more than 28 days in hospital or eight weeks in a care home is being 
arranged or changed. Finally, The MCA created the Court of Protection which attempts to 
resolve any disputes and appeals against decisions of the Court of Protection can also made, 
with permission, to the Court of Appeal. Under the MHA people can appeal to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal and, if they are under compulsory powers for six months and have not 
appealed themselves then the Hospital Managers’ have a duty to refer them. 
 
Issues in practice 
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Given the complex nature of the MCA and its interface with the MHA, it is not surprising that 
many dilemmas face professionals when using these laws. As highlighted above, in their early, 
influential paper Dawson and Szmukler (2006) raised concerns that this split in laws may lead 
to potentially discriminating practices. Owen, David, Richardson, Szmukler, Hayward and 
Hotopf (2009) found that professional judgements about service users experiencing psychoses 
and manic episodes of bipolar disorders were most strongly associated with incapacity, and 
that insight was the best discriminator of capacity status in these disorders. At present it is 
debatable how much impact the MCA has had on the practice of mental health professionals 
when both laws coincide in these ways as the MHA tends to be used and still allows for the 
compulsory treatment of people who have the capacity to refuse it. 
 
Where carers are sensitively involved in decision-making, positive relationships can be built 
between them and professionals (Manthorpe, Samsi & Rapaport, 2009). Others (Rapaport, 
Manthorpe & Stanley, 2009) suggest that a drift towards substitute decision-making might be 
shaped by risk averse rather than rights based approaches. A Welsh study (Lepping, Sambhi & 
Williams-Jones, 2010) examined how agencies managed DOLS processes. No service users 
were found to have been deprived of their liberty, 8% lacked capacity to make either basic or 
complex decisions and another 5% lacked capacity to make complex decisions. Documentation 
was good in mental health and community directorates, but there were gaps in documentation 
(not practice) in the medical and surgical directorates. Routine collection of data improved 
documentation regarding deprivation of liberty criteria. They concluded by suggesting a 
likelihood that senior nursing staff underestimate the number of patients who lack capacity.  
 
Brown, Barber and Martin (2009) discuss a number of problems associated with advance 
decision-making, as summarised in the case of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)  
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[1992] 4 All ER 649, including the important issue of how far the decision-maker has to go to 
establish the existence and validity of the advance decision. Few studies have been carried out 
into the way IMCA services have functioned since the introduction of the MCA. Redley, Clare, 
Dunn, Platten and Holland (2011) surveyed stakeholders during the first year of the operation 
of IMCA services as applied to adult safeguarding contexts. Although there were generally 
positive views expressed about the benefits of the new services, it was apparent that there are 
inconsistencies in the way that individuals and organisations carried out assessments, some 
problems around service integration and unmet training needs. 
 
3.4 Northern Ireland 
The legal framework for supported and substitute decision-making 
In Northern Ireland there is not yet a specific mental capacity law to facilitate substitute 
decision-making across health, welfare and financial decisions for people with mental health 
problems who are not able to make the relevant decisions. The current framework is provided 
by a number of overlapping areas of law and policy. For physical health, and most mental 
health, decisions, if the person is unable to make the relevant decision, substitute decision-
making is allowed under common law which requires that decisions, by those intervening, must 
be made in a person’s best interests. The Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (MHO) 
enables substitute decision-making about the assessment and treatment of mental health 
problems; some welfare decisions under Guardianship; and the management of property and 
financial affairs (through the Office of Care and Protection). Guardianship under this Order 
provides very limited powers and is not a global substitute decision-making framework. Under 
Article 22(1) the guardian can require the person to reside at a specific place; require them to 
attend specific places for treatment, occupation, education or training; and require the person 
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to allow specific people access to where they are living. There is no sanction when here is lack 
of compliance in these situations.    
 
Other relevant policy and guidance for substitute decision-making exists which tends to relate 
more to supporting people to make their own decisions and so avoid the need for substitute 
decision-making. The Code of Practice (Department of Health and Social Services, 1992) for 
the MHO states that ‘even when consent is not legally required, every attempt should be made 
to explain what is proposed and to obtain the patient’s agreement’ (para.5.9). The Department 
of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) (2003) also provided more a more 
general ‘Guide to Consent for Examination, Treatment or Care’. The current mental health 
policy, the Bamford Action Plan 2012-2015 (DHSSPS, 2012) asserts that people with mental 
health problems should expect to be encouraged and supported ‘to look after their own health’ 
and ‘be supported…in their life choices’ (p. 15). 
 
In Northern Ireland it is currently proposed to introduce a new comprehensive legal framework, 
the Mental Capacity (Health, Welfare and Finance) Bill, to require that all practicable steps are 
taken to support decision-making and then, if necessary, to enable substitute decision-making 
for everyone who is not able to make a specific decision including if this is because of mental 
health problems. It is therefore proposed that this new law would provide a framework for 
supported and substitute decision-making for everyone and so a separate, potentially 
discriminatory, mental health law would no longer be needed (Dawson & Szmukler, 2006; 
Bamford Review of Mental Health and Learning Disability, 2007).     
 
The criteria for intervention 
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Substitute decision-making under the common law has to be based on a reasonable belief that 
the person doesn’t have the ability to make the relevant decision and then the intervention must 
be in the person’s best interests. Intervention under the MHO is based on judgements about 
mental disorder and risk rather than impaired decision-making ability and so, in specific 
circumstances, compulsory treatment can still be imposed on a person who has the capacity to 
refuse it. The criteria for compulsory admission to hospital are set out in Article 4(2) which 
specifies that “An application for assessment may be made in respect of a patient on the grounds 
that: (a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants his detention 
in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment followed by medical treatment); and (b) failure 
to so detain him would create a substantial likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or to 
other persons”. The criteria for Guardianship are specified in Article 18(2) and are that: “(a) he 
is suffering from mental illness or severe mental handicap of a nature or degree which warrants 
his reception into guardianship under this Article; and (b) it is necessary in the interests of the 
welfare of the patient that he should be so received”. 
 
Under the proposed Mental Capacity (Health, Welfare and Finance) Bill, which is currently 
the subject of public consultation (Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety 
and Department of Justice, 2014), it is proposed that substitute decision-making would only be 
allowed when it is established that the person is unable to make the specific decision despite 
efforts to support them to do so. The gateway criterion for all substitute decision-making would 
therefore be impaired decision-making ability. 
 
The assessment process 
Assessment and intervention under the common law can be carried out by anyone. Under the 
MHO compulsory intervention must be based on a medical recommendation and an application 
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completed by the person’s Nearest Relative or, more commonly, by an Approved Social 
Worker (ASW). Interestingly the person’s Nearest Relative or an ASW can also apply for 
Guardianship but it must be accompanied by two medical recommendations and a 
recommendation by another ASW. Under the proposed Mental Capacity Bill the assessment 
process would depend on the level of proposed intervention. Routine interventions could be 
based on a reasonable belief that the person was unable to make the decision. More serious 
interventions would require a formal and recorded assessment by an appropriately trained 
person. Interventions that involved interventions with potentially long-term consequences 
and/or deprivation of liberty and/or resistance or objection would require assessment by a 
medical practitioner and an ASW. 
   
Safeguards 
For decisions under the common law, unresolved differences and disputes must be referred to 
the High Court. Under the MHO it is possible to appeal to a Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
The Mental Capacity Bill will provide a range of safeguards across the different levels of 
intervention. The principles of autonomy and best interests will apply to everyone, but for 
serious interventions a nominated person will be consulted and involved and for some serious 
interventions a second opinion, an independent advocate and an authorisation process will be 
required. It will also be possible for people, and their nominated persons, to appeal to a 
Capacity Tribunal.     
 
Issues in practice 
The absence of a comprehensive legal framework means that most substitute decisions about 
health, welfare and finance are taken informally without formal safeguards. There are unusual 
anomalies such as an assumption that people in psychiatric hospitals are viewed as being 
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voluntary incapable. This only refers to their financial decision-making capacity under 
common law but in practice, across settings, people are still sometimes regarded as globally 
capable/incapable. The MHO allows the possibility of compulsory intervention with someone 
who has the capacity to decide about the intervention. It is also not clear how consistently 
and/or well the guidance on informing and supporting consent is being implemented. 
 
4. Discussion 
We agree with Carney’s (2012) assertion that these complex issues associated with supported 
and substituted decision making in mental health services cannot be understood without an 
analysis of the social, political and professional contexts within jurisdictions. We believe that 
in comparing these influences and variations across jurisdictions it may be able to shed some 
light on these crucial, but often nuanced decision-making processes. In beginning this 
discussion about the  legal frameworks in the chosen  jurisdictions it is possible to argue that 
all attempt to address the similar problems and opportunities in providing  support for people 
to make their own decisions, and when that is not possible, for a substitute decision to be made. 
The criteria and powers are broadly similar but, in light of the developments in practice and 
the CRPD, there are some interesting contrasting positions to highlight. 
 
These comparisons can be viewed in the light of  ongoing philosophical and ethical debates 
about the relative importance of informed consent, autonomy, duty of care and protection of 
others reflected in these legal frameworks.  The Health Care and Consent Act in Ontario 
provides the most comprehensive framework for considering and respecting autonomy because 
it applies across all aspects of health care and treatment. In the other jurisdictions however, the 
views of a person with the capacity to refuse treatment can still be contradicted by substitute 
decision makers if there are sufficient concerns about their mental health and the level of risk 
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they present. It will be interesting to observe  if the proposed Mental Capacity (Health, Welfare 
and Finance) Bill in Northern Ireland can provide a legal framework which would only allow 
compulsory intervention if the person was unable to make the relevant decision. This approach 
was considered in the reform processes in Victoria and England and Wales but a dual mental 
health/mental capacity approach was continued.   
 
All the current mental health law and capacity/guardianship laws described above include some 
form of disability criterion. So, even when the emphasis is focused on whether the person can 
make the relevant decision, in other words the functional approach, the criteria still include that 
the person must have some form of disability, disorder or diagnosis. It is interesting to consider 
whether this initial disability criterion is necessary and/or what its purpose is. The debate 
around Article 12 of the CRPD could suggest that these criteria may be both unnecessary and 
discriminatory. On the other hand it might be argued that a functional approach without some 
form of disability criterion would extend compulsory powers into areas, such as alcohol and 
drug use, where it has not traditionally been applied, beyond emergency interventions. What 
seems clear, however, is that laws which rely solely on judgements about the evidence of 
mental disorder and risk, in other words, a disability criterion without any requirement to 
consider the person’s functional ability to make a decision, are not compatible with even the 
most cautious interpretation of the CRPD. That most mental health laws, except those that 
contain or are under, a primary capacity gateway criterion, are incompatible with Article 12 
would seem one of the most obvious and important implications of the CRPD in practice 
although this is not where most of the debate  has tended to be. 
 
The MCA in England and Wales included supported decision-making as one of its principles 
and the Victorian government has emphasised supported decision-making in its new legal 
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framework but there is still uncertainty across the jurisdictions about what a commitment in 
the law means in practice. The MCA Code of Practice (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 
2007) suggests supporting someone to make their own decision by taking all practicable steps 
to: provide relevant information; communicate in an appropriate way; make the person feel at 
ease; and support the person. As Browning and colleagues (2014) suggest, it may be useful to 
distinguish between formal support decision-making as part of a legal process and more 
‘decision-making assistance’ for people, yet both appear necessary to promote autonomy and 
to support people to exercise their legal capacity on an equal basis with others. As 
acknowledged in the introduction to this paper, the complexities of supported decision making, 
especially what works for whom, is an important and developing area of practice and research. 
 
A central issue across the jurisdictions are the complexities of the legal frameworks. It could 
be argued that a number of laws using highly specialist language may be necessary to address 
the range and nature of the issues involved in mental health and mental capacity services. 
However, even if that is the case, it would seem especially important that laws in this area are 
clear and accessible. Part of this usage can certainly be explained in terms of how these legal 
frameworks have developed over time. This  justification, however, is less convincing for the 
more recent reform processes and there would appear to be a central irony that laws intended 
to promote and protect autonomy are opaque and difficult  for service users and carers to 
understand.  
 
Although the range of procedural safeguards are similar across the jurisdictions there are clear 
differences in the processes leading to compulsory interventions, the authorisation and appeal 
processes,  statutory advocacy services  and the time frames involved. In light of international 
human rights standards, such as the United Nations Mental Illness Principles, the European 
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Convention on Human Rights and the CRPD there would appear to be decreasing justification 
for these, albeit relatively minor, differences.     
 
In practice, where there are both mental health and mental capacity laws, the power conferred 
on professionals by mental health legislation tends to dominate mental health practice. It is 
possible that many of the issues associated with the ways in which  these laws are implemented 
in these contexts may not be effectively addressed by further reform of legislation, but perhaps 
by more appropriate use of the current laws and improved mental health services which could 
prevent the need for compulsion.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Developments in practice, law and the growing importance of the CRPD have provoked much 
interesting and progressive debate about the legal frameworks for supported and substitute 
decision-making. Whatever shape these frameworks take across jurisdictions there is an 
obvious need for them to be clear, coherent and accessible and this should be promoted through 
increased service user/consumer and carer involvement in reform processes. It is encouraging 
that across the jurisdictions that we have described and analysed there is increasing attention 
on how to support people to make their own decisions but this does not seemed to have moved 
far beyond the acceptance that this is a sound principle. The differences between the 
jurisdictions in terms of roles and responsibilities in assessment, and safeguards, are becoming 
harder to justify; it is also the case that international human rights standards could be more 
specific about what is required to ensure that such principles are realised. Although a driver for 
change to these laws has been the universal shifts from institutional to community based care, 
the laws described above raise many questions about the protection of rights and the use of 
coercion in community settings. New approaches which are more focused on compelling 
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service providers, rather than the people they are designed to support, may facilitate the 
necessary change. Legal frameworks can provide an outline of what should be in place but they 
are insufficient without the necessary training, resources, monitoring and enforcement 
processes to ensure that citizens are receiving the appropriate levels of support, care and 
protection of rights. Finally, it would appear that the debate about the future of laws based on 
mental disorder and risk, rather than decision-making ability, will continue for some time yet. 
The progress and implementation of the proposed new framework for Northern Ireland, and 
reform endeavours in the field elsewhere, may help inform this debate.      
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Summary 
table 
Ontario Victoria England and 
Wales 
Northern Ireland 
Legal 
framework 
Substitute 
Decisions Act 
1992; Health 
Care Consent 
Act, 1996; and 
the Mental 
Health Act (most 
recently 
amended in 
2000?). The 
Health Care and 
Consent Act and 
Substitute 
Decisions Act 
Guardianship and 
Administration 
Act 1986 (Vic), 
Mental Health 
Act 2014, the 
Instruments Act 
1958 (Vic) and 
the Medical 
Treatment Act 
1988 (Vic) 
 
 
Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 and 
Mental Health 
Act 1983/2007 
 
Common law and 
Mental Health 
(Northern 
Ireland) Order 
1986 
 
Proposed Mental 
Capacity (Health, 
Welfare and 
Finance) Bill 
Criteria for 
intervention 
To understand 
the information 
that is relevant to 
making a 
decision about 
the treatment, 
admission or 
personal 
assistance 
Mental Health 
Act 2014 requires 
four criteria be 
met including that 
the person has 
mental illness and 
it is required for 
their health or 
safety or for the 
For intervention 
under the MCA 
the person must 
be unable to 
understand, 
retain, use or 
weigh, or 
communicate the 
relevant 
A reasonable 
belief that the 
person doesn’t 
have the ability to 
make the relevant 
decision and then 
the intervention 
must be in the 
46 
 
46 
 
service, as the 
case may be, and 
able to 
appreciate the 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
consequences of 
a decision or 
lack of decision” 
protection of 
others. 
For Guardianship 
the person must 
have a disability 
and be unable to 
make reasonable 
judgments. 
 
information and 
decision. 
 
For the MHA it’s 
the traditional 
mental disorder 
and risk criteria. 
  
person’s best 
interests. 
 
Mental disorder 
and risk. 
 
Assessment No assessment 
tool to record, 
verify, organize 
and summarize 
the relevant 
information 
gathered from 
the person being 
assessed, as well 
as from family, 
professional 
care-givers or 
multi-
disciplinary 
consultants and 
review of 
Assessment Order 
- may be 
community or 
inpatient 
- registered 
medical 
practitioner or 
mental health 
practitioner must 
examine person 
before making 
Assessment Order 
(and not more 
than 24 hours 
have passed since 
examination) 
No common 
assessment tool, 
but Codes of 
Practice Guidance 
 
A functional 
rather than status 
approach to 
assessing 
capacity. 
 
Encouragement 
of the person to 
fully participate 
in the decision-
making process, 
Assessment and 
intervention 
under the 
common law can 
be carried out by 
anyone. Under 
the Mental Health 
(Northern 
Ireland) Order 
1986 compulsory 
intervention must 
be based on a 
medical 
recommendation 
and an application 
completed by the 
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47 
 
objective 
records. 
- may be 
extended for 24 
hours (only 
twice) and must 
be examined 
before being 
extended 
- may be varied 
Examination by 
authorised 
psychiatrist 
- as soon as 
practicable after 
community 
assessment order 
made 
or after received 
at designated 
mental health 
service 
- determine 
whether treatment 
criteria apply 
consideration of 
past and present 
interests, consider 
their beliefs and 
attitudes and to 
consult relevant 
professionals, 
carers and 
relatives. 
 
Complexity of 
DOLS 
person’s Nearest 
Relative or, more 
commonly, by an 
Approved Social 
Worker. 
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48 
 
- revoke 
Assessment Order 
or make 
Temporary 
Treatment Order 
For Guardianship 
there is a 
functional 
approach to 
assessing capacity
Safeguards Power of 
attorney for 
personal care or 
‘Ulysses 
Contract’ 
 
Consent and 
Capacity Board 
 
Advocacy 
services  
 
Mental Health 
Tribunal  
Advance 
Statements 
Nominated 
Persons 
Victorian Civil 
and 
Administration 
Tribunal (VCAT) 
Advocacy 
services 
MHRT 
 
IMCAs 
 
Best Interests 
Assessors 
 
DOLS 
 
Lasting Power of 
Attorney 
 
Advance 
decisions 
MHRT 
 
Enduring Powers 
of Attorney 
 
Office of Care 
and Protection, 
High Court 
 
Advocacy 
services 
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Practice Possible 
inconsistencies 
across 
assessments and 
areas of practice.  
HCCA may be 
considered more 
in mental than 
physical health, 
SDA may be 
considered more 
in the area of 
intellectual 
disability than 
mental health.  
Complexity of 
the framework. 
Criteria for 
CTOs. 
 
Very high levels 
of involuntary 
treatment 
especially CTOs 
New mechanisms 
to support a 
recovery 
approach and 
supported 
decision making 
include Advance 
statements and 
nominated 
persons and 
increased 
advocacy. 
Also the 
legislation 
emphasises the 
‘presumption of 
capacity’ 
Interface between 
MHA and MCA 
 
Overly complex 
nature of DOLS 
and BIAs 
 
CTOs 
 
 
No current mental 
capacity law.  
People still 
sometimes 
regarded as 
globally 
capable/incapable
. 
The Mental 
Health (Northern 
Ireland) Order 
1986 allows the 
possibility of 
compulsory 
intervention with 
someone who has 
the capacity to 
decide about the 
intervention. 
No CTOs, but 
proposed in new 
legislation 
 
